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The Liberal Conscience, by Lucas Swaine. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006. Pp. xix + 215. $36.50 (paper).
JeremY NeILL, Saint Louis University
Lucas Swaine’s The Liberal Conscience is an original and insightful analy-
sis of the troubled relationship between liberalism and religious belief. 
The arguments of Conscience are clear, well-organized, and articulated in 
a refreshing dialectical style. The central purpose of Conscience is evan-
gelization—not the evangelization of religious unbelievers by religious 
believers, but rather the evangelization of religious believers by political 
liberals. More specifically, Conscience is an attempt to render the norms 
and institutions of political liberalism acceptable to a particular class of 
religious believers—a class that Swaine calls ‘theocrats.’ By ‘theocrats,’ 
Swaine means those people who prefer “a mode of governance prioritiz-
ing a religious conception of the good that is strict and comprehensive in 
its range of teachings” (p. 7).
Conscience can be fruitfully divided into two different conceptual mo-
ments or emphases. The first of these two conceptual emphases is an 
attempt to convince theocrats to support liberal political regimes. The 
second conceptual emphasis is a series of loosely-related practical sugges-
tions that Swaine makes in an attempt to render the relationship between 
theocrats and liberal political regimes more productive.
The first conceptual emphasis of Conscience is an attempt to convince 
theocrats to support liberal political regimes. The natural inclination of 
many contemporary theocrats is to prefer a form of government that is 
centered on a comprehensive religious conception of the good. The way 
in which liberal political regimes ought to treat these theocrats, Swaine 
argues, should be dependent upon the way in which the theocrats choose 
to manifest their particular comprehensive religious conceptions of the 
good. Swaine draws a strong distinction between two different kinds of 
theocrats—ambitious and retiring (p. 9). The distinction between ambi-
tious theocrats and retiring theocrats demarcates two wholly different 
ways of manifesting a comprehensive religious conception of the good. 
Ambitious theocrats favor vigorous participation in the public square, 
whereas retiring theocrats intentionally make themselves absent from the 
public square.
Most contemporary theocrats, whether ambitious or retiring, are un-
comfortable in liberal societies (pp. 12–15). For Swaine, the reason why 
they are so uncomfortable is that liberal political theorists have failed to 
provide them with adequate reasons for supporting liberal political re-
gimes (pp. 15–20). For this reason, Swaine does not join his fellow liber-
als in appealing to ideologically neutral reasons to justify liberalism to 
theocrats. Rather, he aims to “provide reasons for theocrats to affirm lib-
eral institutions on grounds they should accept, without circumscribing 
or casting aside their most basic otherworldly aspirations and assump-
tions” (p. 40). At the heart of Swaine’s attempt to convince theocrats to 
endorse liberal political regimes is an appeal to the value of the liberty of 
conscience (pp. 45–61). It proceeds as follows: to believe in a comprehen-
sive religious good is to believe that it is possible to live erroneously with 
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respect to this good. But to believe that it is possible to live erroneously 
with respect to the good is to believe that it is possible for people who 
desire to live correctly with respect to the good to endorse an erroneous 
conception of the good, perhaps without realizing it. Theocrats desire to 
live in a society in which the comprehensive religious good is embraced, 
legislated, and enforced at the highest political level. Yet even in a society 
that is wholly devoted to the pursuit of the comprehensive religious good, 
it is still possible for the view that theocratic political regimes have of the 
comprehensive religious good to become corrupted over time (and, by 
extension, for their citizens’ understanding of the comprehensive religious 
good to become corrupted as well).
The way to resolve the problem of belief corruption is to promote the 
freedom of the individual conscience: “the theocrat ought to understand 
that he has a powerful rational commitment to the notion that conscience 
must be free, given his values and the ends he aims to achieve” (p. 48). There 
are three different kinds of freedom of conscience that Swaine thinks that 
theocrats ought to endorse: first, the belief that “Conscience must be free 
to reject lesser religious doctrines and conceptions of the good”; second, 
the belief that “Conscience must be free to accept the good”; and third, the 
belief that “Conscience must be free to distinguish between good and bad 
doctrines and conceptions of the good” (p. 49). Were theocrats to promote 
the freedom of conscience in these three ways, they would be rendering 
themselves capable, at least potentially, of always pursuing the correct 
version of the comprehensive religious good. The problem, of course, is 
that the liberty of the individual conscience is part of a locus of values that 
contemporary theocrats have generally repudiated.
To convince contemporary theocrats to support liberal political re-
gimes, Swaine must demonstrate to them that it is to their advantage to 
do so. To this end he argues that the motivation that theocrats have (or 
ought to have) to value the liberty of conscience ought also to motivate 
them to support the kinds of political regimes that promote the freedom 
of the individual conscience (pp. 51–54). The kinds of political regimes 
that promote the freedom of the individual conscience are liberal political 
regimes. Suppose a theocratic citizen were to lose her confidence in her 
understanding of the comprehensive religious good. Were she then to at-
tempt to alter her understanding of the comprehensive religious good in 
pursuit of an understanding that she believed to be a better understand-
ing, the liberal political regime would not mistreat or persecute her for 
altering her beliefs. Since liberal political regimes promote the locus of val-
ues that theocrats ought to embrace by virtue of their commitment to the 
pursuit of the true version of the comprehensive religious good, it makes 
sense for theocrats to favor them.
Let us evaluate Swaine’s argument. The strength of the argument is that 
it appeals to a political reality that is quite evidently true—liberal political 
regimes do tolerate a diversity of belief systems among their citizens. The 
weakness of the argument is that it seems to overlook some of the negative 
characteristics of contemporary liberal societies. Consider the following 
objection. Liberal societies allow their citizens to pursue their own pri-
vate conceptions of the comprehensive good. Yet no human being is an 
island. We are all deeply dependent upon each other. To pursue what we 
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understand to be the true version of the comprehensive good (whatever it 
might be), we are continually compelled to rely upon the financial, social, 
and institutional support of our friends, family, and neighbors. The moral 
ecology of our society is, therefore, an essential and necessary component 
of our ability to pursue the good. If the moral ecology of our society were 
to become significantly different from our own beliefs, such that it was no 
longer conducive to our ability to pursue what we understand to be the 
true version of the comprehensive good, then it would render our abil-
ity to do so very difficult (if not impossible). Our every effort to attain 
the true version of the comprehensive good would be thwarted, whether 
intentionally or inadvertently, by the efforts and interests of the citizens 
around us. The likelihood of this happening is significant in a liberal soci-
ety whose tolerance for a diversity of comprehensive goods promotes the 
existence of numerous different belief systems.
Many contemporary theocrats feel that this is just what has happened to 
modern liberal societies. Modern liberal societies, through their tolerance 
of a diversity of possible belief systems, have destroyed a once cohesive 
moral ecology and have rendered it extremely difficult for theocrats to 
pursue what they take to be the true version of the comprehensive good. 
Theocrats favor religiously-centered political regimes because religious-
ly-centered political regimes are capable of forestalling the hostile moral 
situations of the kind that exist in modern liberal societies. So Swaine’s at-
tempt to convince theocrats to support liberal political regimes still seems 
to need to deal adequately with the issue of what it means to really live as 
a dependent human being who is attempting to pursue a particular un-
derstanding of the comprehensive religious good in a moral environment 
that is hostile to this particular understanding.
The second conceptual emphasis of Conscience is a series of loosely-
related practical suggestions that are designed to render the relationship 
between theocrats and liberal political regimes more productive. One of 
the most interesting and optimistic of these practical suggestions is the 
legal framework that Swaine develops to address the issues raised by 
the existence of communities of retiring theocrats. Swaine’s proposal is 
that communities of retiring theocrats should be allowed to retain a large 
amount of semi-sovereignty over their internal social affairs (pp. 90–94). 
There would, of course, be general human rights conditions which com-
munities of retiring theocrats would have to fulfill in order to retain this 
right of semi-sovereignty for an extended period of time.
Swaine’s suggestions for dealing with ambitious theocrats, outlined 
in chapter four, are just as optimistic as his suggestions for dealing with 
retiring theocrats. He is particularly interested in the possibility of in-
cluding ambitious theocrats in a peaceful and productive way in liberal 
political processes. Part of this inclusion process, Swaine argues, is a 
willingness on liberal political theorists’ part to re-evaluate the doctrine 
of public reason, and to consider again what should be included and 
what should be excluded from the public square (pp. 121–126). If liberal 
political theorists were to conduct a genuine re-evaluation of the doc-
trine of public reason, Swaine believes that they would find it productive 
to allow ambitious theocrats to use religious forms of reasoning in the 
public square. Liberty of conscience is the value that is at the heart of 
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public reason. Ambitious theocrats endorse the positions that they do for 
religious reasons. In appealing to religious reasons, ambitious theocrats 
are embodying the value of liberty of conscience, for it is by their exercise 
of the liberty of conscience that they come to endorse the positions that 
they do. For this reason, liberal political theorists ought to be open to the 
possibility of allowing ambitious theocrats to invoke religious reasons in 
the public square (p. 125).
Swaine’s book should be commended for its sensitive and nuanced 
treatment of religion. The paradox, of course, is that Conscience is not like-
ly to be read by the very theocrats that could most profit from reading it. 
The most likely readers of Conscience are the liberal political theorists who 
already agree with Swaine’s message. The fact that fine books like Con-
science are probably only going to be read by the people who already agree 
with them is a testament to the reality that we are not really dialoguing 
with the other belief systems that exist alongside our own in the contem-
porary public square. If both sides of the public religion debate were to 
read reconciliation proposals like Swaine’s Conscience, it would go a long 
way toward overcoming this reality.
immortality Defended, by John Leslie. Blackwell, 2007. Pp. 97. $19.95 (cloth).
LeSLIe STeVeNSON, University of St. Andrews, Scotland
The title of John Leslie’s new slim volume is potentially misleading. Al-
though he offers three varieties of immortality, two of them involve it 
only in a Pickwickian sense. And the defense he has to offer (of all three) 
may be thought rather loose, at best. In fact, Leslie uses more than half 
his space trying to make plausible the underlying metaphysical picture 
that he is enamoured of, namely a combination of Platonism and Spinozist 
pantheism.
The most fundamental principle inspiring Leslie’s thought in this book 
is one he attributes to Plato: “The actual world of people and objects is a 
good one and it exists simply because it ought to. Its ethical requiredness—
the fact that there is an ethical need for it—is itself creatively effective” (p. 2). 
To this, Leslie adds his own interpretation of Spinoza: “There is a divine 
mind, a mind whose reality is due to the eternal ethical need for it. We, like 
all the other intricately structured things of our universe, exist merely be-
cause the mind in question thinks of this universe in all its details” (p. 3). 
As Leslie acknowledges, some theologians will not identify this meta-
physical “divine mind” with the personal, self-revelatory (indeed incar-
nate) God they believe in.
Not content with this degree of speculation, Leslie proceeds to add two 
dimensions of infinity. Unsatisfactory features of our lives prompt him 
to speculate that the divine mind might also think of immensely many 
other universes, thereby making them just as real as the imperfect one we 
inhabit (pp. 7, 10). Then, without apparent motivation, Leslie announces 
that ”this book will defend a pantheism of infinitely many divine minds, 
